Audit Report

The Farm Credit Administration’s Compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act for Fiscal Year 2020

A-20-02

October 30, 2020
October 30, 2020

The Honorable Glen R. Smith, Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
The Honorable Jeffery S. Hall, Board Member  
Farm Credit Administration  
1501 Farm Credit Drive  
McLean, VA 22102-5090

Dear Chairman Smith and Board Member Hall:

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires the Inspector General of each agency to annually conduct an independent evaluation of the agency’s information security program. The Office of Inspector General contracted with the independent public accounting firm Williams, Adley, & Company-DC, LLP (Williams Adley) to conduct an audit for the Fiscal Year 2020 FISMA review. The contract required Williams Adley to follow the Fiscal Year 2020 Inspector General FISMA Reporting Metrics, dated April 17, 2020. Williams Adley conducted the audit in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards.

The attached audit report summarizes the results of Williams Adley’s independent audit. Williams Adley concluded that the Farm Credit Administration’s (FCA) information security program is effective based on the auditors’ analysis of 67 metrics under the Department of Homeland Security’s scoring methodology. Williams Adley reported that FCA improved aspects of its information security program, such as enhancing its privacy program. However, as described in the attached report, Williams Adley identified opportunities for improvement in key areas. The report contains eight recommendations that will assist FCA in improving the effectiveness of its information security program.

In connection with the contract, we monitored the work performed by Williams Adley. Our review, as differentiated from an audit in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards, was not intended to enable us to express, and we do not express, opinions on or conclusions about the effectiveness of FCA’s information security program. Williams Adley is responsible for the attached report dated October 30, 2020 and the conclusions expressed therein. However, our review disclosed no instances where Williams Adley did not comply, in all material respects, with U.S. Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards.

Williams Adley’s report contains sensitive information about FCA and potential vulnerabilities that could be used against FCA. Therefore, portions of this report containing sensitive information will be redacted before publishing the report on our website.
Respectfully,

Sonya K. Cerne
Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

cc: Wendy R. Laguarda
    Inspector General

Enclosure
Background
The President signed into law the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) on December 18, 2014. FISMA provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls, minimum controls for agency systems, and improved oversight of agency information security programs. FISMA requires Offices of Inspector General (OIG) to perform an annual independent evaluation. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, in consultation with the Federal Chief Information Officer Council, developed the fiscal year (FY) 2020 Inspector General FISMA Reporting metrics. The FY 2020 metrics are aligned with the five function areas in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.

Objectives
The objectives of this audit were to independently assess the Farm Credit Administration’s (FCA) information security program using the metrics identified by DHS and determine the effectiveness of FCA’s information security program and practices.

The FCA OIG retained independent public accounting firm Williams Adley & Company-DC, LLP (Williams Adley) to perform the independent evaluation of FCA’s implementation of FISMA for FY 2020 as an audit under Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards. This report presents the results of that audit. Williams Adley also prepared responses to the annual FISMA reporting metrics for OIGs, which the FCA OIG will submit via DHS’s automated application in accordance with OMB guidance.

The audit found that FCA has an information security program that continues to mature. FCA’s information security program is ranked Effective based on the auditors’ analysis of 67 metrics under the DHS scoring methodology.

The table below summarizes the results from CyberScope’s scoring. Each information security function area and domain are discussed in more detail in the body of this report.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Ranking Assigned in CyberScope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>Managed and Measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
<td>Consistently Implemented</td>
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<td>Protect</td>
<td>Identity and Access Management</td>
<td>Consistently Implemented</td>
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<td>Protect</td>
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<td>Defined</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Security Training</td>
<td>Consistently Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect</td>
<td>Information Security Continuous Monitoring</td>
<td>Managed and Measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
<td>Incident Response</td>
<td>Consistently Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>Contingency Planning</td>
<td>Ad Hoc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Williams Adley made eight recommendations to the Office of Information Technology related to updating the information security policy and Information Security Continuous Monitoring Strategy to strengthen and improve FCA’s information security and privacy program.
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<tr>
<td>CIGIE</td>
<td>Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOP</td>
<td>Continuity of Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Data Protection and Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>Disaster Recovery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA or Agency</td>
<td>Farm Credit Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>FISMA</td>
<td>Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAGAS</td>
<td>Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAM</td>
<td>Identity, Credential, and Access Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCM</td>
<td>Information Security Continuous Monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Institute of Standards and Technology</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIT</td>
<td>Office of Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>PII</td>
<td>Personally Identifiable Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>Policies and Procedures Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAOP</td>
<td>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Special Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>sPII</td>
<td>Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information</td>
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</table>
OBJECTIVE

The Farm Credit Administration (FCA or Agency) Office of Inspector General (OIG) retained independent public accounting firm Williams, Adley & Company-DC, LLP (Williams Adley) to perform an independent evaluation of FCA’s implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) for fiscal year (FY) 2020 as an audit. This report presents the results of that audit. Williams Adley also prepared responses to the annual FISMA reporting metrics for OIGs, which the FCA OIG will submit via the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) automated application in accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.

The objectives of the audit were to perform an independent audit of the FCA’s implementation of FISMA and to determine the effectiveness of the information security program for FY 2020.

BACKGROUND AND CRITERIA

On December 18, 2014, the President signed FISMA, which reformed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. FISMA outlines the information security management requirements for agencies, including an annual independent evaluation of an agency’s information security program and practices to determine their effectiveness. This evaluation must include testing the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices for a representative subset of the agency’s information systems. The evaluation also must include an assessment of the effectiveness of the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency. FISMA requires the annual evaluation to be performed by the agency’s OIG or by an independent external firm. OMB Memorandum 20-04, FY 2019-2020 Guidance on Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Requirements, dated November 19, 2019, requires the OIG to report their responses to OMB’s annual FISMA reporting questions for OIGs via CyberScope.

OMB, in coordination with the DHS, provides guidance on reporting categories and responds to questions for meeting the current fiscal year’s reporting requirements.¹ OMB uses the data to carry out its oversight responsibilities and to prepare its annual report to Congress on the entities’ compliance with FISMA.

Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework)

In response to the growing concern related to cybersecurity, Executive Order 13636² was issued in 2013, which requires the development of a set of industry standards and best practices to help organizations manage information security risks to combat cybersecurity challenges. Resulting

from this Executive Order was the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (Cybersecurity Framework). The Cybersecurity Framework provides guidelines for organizations to protect critical infrastructure by using business drivers to direct information security activities and to consider information security risks as part of the organization’s risk management processes.

To emphasize the importance of protecting critical infrastructure, Executive Order 13800 was issued to hold agency heads accountable for managing cybersecurity risk in their organizations. Specifically, Executive Order 13800 defines effective risk management as requiring agency heads to lead integrated teams of senior executives with expertise in information technology (IT), security, budgeting, acquisition, law, privacy, and human resources. Furthermore, Executive Order 13800 requires agency heads to use the Cybersecurity Framework to manage the agency’s cybersecurity risk and hold agency heads accountable for ensuring that cybersecurity risk management processes are aligned with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes.

The Cybersecurity Framework provides federal agencies with a common structure for identifying and managing information security risks across the enterprise and provides guidance for assessing the maturity of controls to address those risks. The Cybersecurity Framework contains five information security functions that give federal agencies the ability to select and prioritize improvements in information security risk management. The five information security functions are as follows:

- **Identify** – The “identify” function requires the development of organizational understanding to manage information security risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities. The activities in the “identify” function are foundational for effective use of the Cybersecurity Framework. Understanding the business context, the resources that support critical functions and the related information security risks enables an organization to focus and prioritize its efforts, consistent with its risk management strategy and business needs.
- **Protect** – The “protect” function requires the development and implementation of appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services. The “protect” function supports the ability to limit or contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event.
- **Detect** – The “detect” function requires the development and implementation of appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event. The “detect” function enables timely discovery of a cybersecurity event.
- **Respond** – The “respond” function requires the development and implementation of

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4 Version 1.1 of the Cybersecurity Framework was published in April 2018 to provide refinements, clarifications, and enhancements to Version 1.0 published in February 2014.
5 According to Executive Order 13636, critical infrastructure is defined as “Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”
appropriate activities to act regarding a detected cybersecurity event. The “respond” function supports the ability to contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event.

- **Recover** – The “recover” function requires the development and implementation of appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired because of a cybersecurity event. The “recover” function supports timely recovery to normal operations to reduce the impact from an information security event.

The five functions (identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover) of the Cybersecurity Framework provide agencies with the structure and guidance to improve their information security program by using an effective risk management strategy to govern and protect their environment. Furthermore, these functions require the use of risk management processes to enable organizations to inform and prioritize decisions regarding information security. The five functions support recurring risk assessments and validation of business drivers to help agencies implement the necessary information security activities that reflect desired outcomes. Each function places reliance on the development of those preceding it. For example, an organization cannot protect its IT environment correctly without first identifying its key information systems and the risks faced by each. Moreover, an organization cannot respond to cybersecurity events if it has not first implemented proper measures to detect them.

**Reporting Metrics**

FISMA requires OMB to ensure that guidance is developed for the independent evaluation of agency information security programs. On April 17, 2020, OMB, DHS, and the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) released the “FY 2020 IG Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 Reporting Metrics.”

This guidance provides metrics to be used to gauge the maturity of agency practices in connection with the eight IG FISMA metric domains that are organized around the five information security functions outlined in the Cybersecurity Framework:

**Identify**

- **Risk Management** – The purpose of the risk management domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s risk management program. An agency with an effective risk management program maintains an accurate inventory of information systems, hardware assets, and software assets; consistently implements its risk management policies, procedures, plans, and strategy at all levels of the organization; and monitors, analyzes, and reports qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its risk management program.

**Protect**

- **Configuration Management** – The purpose of the configuration management domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s configuration management program. An agency with

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an effective configuration management program uses automation to maintain an accurate view of the security configurations for all information system components connected to the agency’s network; consistently implements its configuration management policies, procedures, plans, and strategy at all levels of the organization; centrally manages its flaw remediation process; and monitors, analyzes, and reports qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its configuration management program.

- **Identity and Access Management** – The purpose of the identity and access management domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s identity and access management program. An agency with an effective identity and access management program ensures that all privileged and non-privileged users use strong authentication to access organizational systems; uses automated mechanisms to support the management of privileged accounts; and monitors, analyzes, and reports qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its identity, credential, and access management program.

- **Security Training** – The purpose of the security training domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s security training program. An agency with an effective security training program addresses all of its identified knowledge, skills, and abilities gaps; measures the effectiveness of its security training program; and ensures staff consistently collect, monitor, and analyze qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its security awareness and training activities.

- **Data Protection and Privacy (DPP)** – The purpose of the data protection and privacy domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s data protection and privacy program. An effective data protection and privacy program enables an agency to ensure protection of its personally identifiable information (PII) and other agency-sensitive data throughout the data lifecycle; respond to privacy events; develop and maintain enhanced network defenses; and monitor, analyze, and report qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its data protection and privacy program.

**Detect**

- **Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM)** – The purpose of the ISCM domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s ISCM program. An agency with an effective ISCM program maintains ongoing authorizations of information systems; integrates metrics on the effectiveness of its ISCM program to deliver persistent situational awareness across the organization; and consistently collects, monitors, and analyzes qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its ISCM policies, procedures, plans, and strategies.

**Respond**

- **Incident Response** – The purpose of the incident response domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency’s incident response program. An agency with an effective incident response program uses profiling techniques to measure the characteristics of expected activities on its network and systems so that it can more effectively detect security events; manages and measures the impact of successful events; uses incident response metrics to manage and
measure the timely reporting of incident information to organizational officials and external stakeholders; and consistently collects, monitors, and analyzes qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its incident response policies, procedures, plans, and strategies.

Recover

- **Contingency Planning** – The purpose of the contingency planning domain is to evaluate the maturity of an agency's contingency planning program. An agency with an effective contingency planning program uses automated mechanisms to thoroughly and effectively test system contingency plans; communicates metrics on the effectiveness of recovery activities to relevant stakeholders; and consistently collects, monitors, and analyzes qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of information system contingency planning program activities.

**NIST Risk Management Framework**

NIST has established the information security risk management best practices via the Risk Management Framework as detailed in the Special Publication (SP) 800-37, Revision 2, Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations,8 and NIST SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk.9 The NIST Risk Management Framework provides guidance for federal agencies to establish a robust enterprise-wide information security risk management programs to guide the implementation of an information security program. This NIST guidance postulates that establishing effective governance and a formalized approach to information security risk management is the critical first step to achieving an effective information security program.

**Maturity Models**

According to the IG FISMA metrics, the effectiveness of an information security program is determined based on the ratings earned on a maturity model spectrum, which identifies whether an agency has developed policies and procedures, implemented documented processes, and established methods to improve over time. The maturity model spectrum is divided into five levels outlined below:

- **Level 1: Ad-Hoc** – Policies, procedures, and strategy are not formalized, and activities are performed in an Ad-Hoc, reactive manner.
- **Level 2: Defined** – Policies, procedures, and strategy are formalized and documented but not consistently implemented.
- **Level 3: Consistently Implemented** – Policies, procedures, and strategy are consistently implemented, but quantitative and qualitative effectiveness measures are lacking.

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• Level 4: Managed and Measurable – Quantitative and qualitative measures on the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and strategy are collected across the organization and then used to assess the organization and make necessary changes.
• Level 5: Optimized – Policies, procedures, and strategy are fully institutionalized, repeatable, self-generating, consistently implemented, and regularly updated based on a changing threat and technology landscape and business/mission needs.

According to the FY 2020 IG FISMA metrics, “a Level 4, Managed and Measurable, information security program is operating at an effective level of security. Generally, a Level 4 maturity level is defined as formalized, documented, and consistently implemented policies, procedures, and strategies and where quantitative and qualitative performance measures on the effectiveness of said policies, procedures, and strategies are collected across the organization and assessed to make necessary changes.”

RESULTS/FINDINGS

Overall Rating
Based on the IG FISMA metric requirements, Williams Adley has concluded that FCA has implemented an effective information security program in FY 2020. FCA continued to improve its information security program and made progress in implementing some of the recommendations resulting from previous FISMA evaluations. FCA also utilizes a risk-based approach to information security and security controls. The information security program contains identity and access management, security and privacy training, and incident response programs.

Additional elements of the information security program include:

• Information security policies and procedures,
• Corrective action processes for significant information security weaknesses,
• Use of a Change Control Board,
• Standard baseline configurations,
• A patch management process,
• Vulnerability and security control assessments,
• Alerts for suspicious activity and devices,
• Continuous monitoring processes,
• Weekly security meetings, and
• Continuity of operations plan.

FCA OIG reported the results of Williams Adley review in DHS’s CyberScope application. The table below summarizes the results from CyberScope’s scoring. Each function and domain are discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections of this report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
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<th>Ranking Assigned in CyberScope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>Level 4: Managed and Measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
<td>Level 3: Consistently Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Identity and Access Management</td>
<td>Level 3: Consistently Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Data Protection and Privacy</td>
<td>Level 2: Defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Security Training</td>
<td>Level 3: Consistently Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect</td>
<td>Information Security Continuous Monitoring</td>
<td>Level 4: Managed and Measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
<td>Incident Response</td>
<td>Level 3: Consistently Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>Contingency Planning</td>
<td>Level 1: Ad-Hoc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Williams Adley found that FCA implemented a computer security program designed to manage identified computer risks and vulnerabilities. To support this program, FCA issued updated Policies and Procedures Manual (PPM) Section 902, *Computer Security Program*, on July 8, 2020. The Implementing Procedures for PPM 902 include roles and responsibilities, as well as guidance about threats and risks associated with the use of information systems. This policy references the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, which was amended by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. Finally, FCA finalized *Office Directive 027 – Information Technology Security and Privacy Training*, which details security training including implementing role-based training for individuals with various information security responsibilities.

However, Williams Adley also identified gaps in documentation and implementation of certain controls. For example,

**Condition:**

**Cause:**

Portions of this report have been redacted to protect information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security.
Effect:

Criteria: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4

Recommendation 1: Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology (OIT)

OIT Response: FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation and will OIT’s estimated completion date for these actions is

Williams Adley Response: The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.

Identify

The Identify function supports an understanding of the business context, the resources that support critical functions, and the related cybersecurity risks that enable an entity to focus and prioritize its efforts, consistent with its risk management strategy and business needs. The Identify function is composed of the risk management process, which includes ongoing information system authorization, and promotes the concept of near-real-time risk management at the entity level, business process level, and information system level.

The information security function area for Identify includes the Risk Management domain. Williams Adley evaluated the domain in the Identify function using the guidance provided by DHS. Based on DHS’s scoring methodology, FCA met the criteria for Level 4, Managed and Measurable.

Risk Management

Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, mitigating, and monitoring risks. An inconsistent and non-comprehensive risk management program creates an operating environment where information security risks could be overlooked and where mitigation strategies may not be implemented. Without fully understanding the complete environment, management may be unknowingly accepting an unacceptable level of risk.

Williams Adley determined FCA’s risk management program is Managed and Measurable based on the risk management metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit.
The Risk Management program includes the following attributes:

- A current system inventory and categorization of all major systems including systems residing in the cloud,
- Email alerts for unauthorized hardware,
- A list of software approved by the Change Control Board,
- A risk management tool to track operational risks,
- Security controls based on risk that identify minimum baseline controls selected and implemented for internal systems,
- Independent assessments of controls,
- A process for tracking identified information security weaknesses through plans of action and milestones and tracking their status,
- Regular and timely communications related to information system security risks among IT staff,
- Communication of risks in a timely and consistent manner with senior management, and
- A process for authorizing information systems based on acceptable risks.

**Condition:**

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**Cause:**

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**Criteria:**

- NIST SP 800-53, REV 4:
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- NIST SP 800-53, REV 4:
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Portions of this report have been redacted to protect information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security.
Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Risk Management domain:

**Recommendation 2:** Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology.

**OIT Response:** FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation and will . OIT’s estimated completion date for these actions is .

**Williams Adley Response:** The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.
Protect

The Protect function seeks to develop and implement safeguards to ensure the delivery of critical infrastructure services by supporting the ability to limit or contain the impact of a potential information security event. The Protect function comprises four domains: configuration management, identity and access management, data protection and privacy, and security training.

In FY 2020, the Protect function operated at Level 3: Consistently Implemented, which reflects the Protect function’s four domains. During FY 2020, three domains—configuration management, identity and access management, and security training—operated at Level 3: Consistently Implemented. The data protection and privacy domain operated at Level 2: Defined.

Configuration Management

According to NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, Configuration Management comprises, “a collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of information technology products and systems, through control of processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems...” A baseline configuration is, “a documented set of specifications for an information system, or a configuration item within a system, that has been formally reviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can be changed only through change control procedures.”

Williams Adley determined FCA’s configuration management program is not effective based on the configuration management metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit. The overall maturity rating level for FCA’s configuration management program is Consistently Implemented.

The configuration management program includes the following attributes:

- An Information Resource Management planning process that guides enterprise-wide IT asset management and investment control,
- A Change Control Board that reviews each proposed change for adverse security risks and configuration impacts,
- Automated alerts that warn of unauthorized hardware on the network,
- Routine scanning and remediation of system vulnerabilities, and
- Automated processes for identification and installation of patches.

Condition:

- [ ]

Portions of this report have been redacted to protect information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security.
Portions of this report have been redacted to protect information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security.
**Effect:**

Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Configuration Management domain:

**Recommendation 3:** Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology (OIT)

**OIT Response:** FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation. OIT’s estimated completion date for the following actions is:

**Williams Adley Response:** The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.

**Identity and Access Management**

Effective access control processes are critical to prevent unauthorized dissemination or modification of data because they ensure that only approved and authorized personnel have access to FCA information. A lack of an effective identity and access management practice increases the risk of unauthorized system access, whether by internal employees or external attackers, endangering the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of FCA systems.

The overall maturity level for FCA’s identity and access management program is **Consistently Implemented**. Williams Adley determined FCA’s identity and access management program is not effective based on the metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit.

The identity and access management program include the following attributes:

- Certification that employees and contractors have read the Agency’s policy on information security,
- System access based on least privilege,
- Automated mechanisms for account management,
- Periodic reviews of active accounts,
- Alerts for suspicious account activity,
- Alerts for unauthorized devices connected to the network,
- Multi-factor authentication for most users, and
- Continuous monitoring of privileged accounts.

**Condition:**

**Cause:**

**Criteria**

- NIST SP 800-53, REV 4:
  -
  -
Effect:

Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Identity and Access Management domain:

Recommendation 4: Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology

OIT Response: FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation. OIT’s estimated completion date for the following actions is:

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Williams Adley Response: The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.

Data Protection and Privacy

Sensitive information, including PII and sensitive personally identifiable information (sPII), should be protected from inappropriate dissemination. Data Protection and Privacy (DPP) is about preventing the unwanted release of sensitive information and responding to any instances where information is found to be inadvertently shared.

OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource, Appendix I § 4(c)(2) (July 28, 2016), requires agencies to:

“Develop and maintain a privacy program plan that provides an overview of the agency’s privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program, the resources dedicated to the privacy program, the role of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy\(^{10}\) and other privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy program, the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks, and any other information determined necessary by the agency’s privacy program;”

OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I § 4(e)(1), defines the Senior Agency Official for Privacy’s (SAOP) responsibilities:

\(^{10}\) Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)
“The SAOP has agency-wide responsibility and accountability for developing, implementing, and maintaining an agency-wide privacy program to manage privacy risks, develop and evaluate privacy policy, and ensure compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, and policies regarding the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of PII\(^{11}\) by programs and information systems.”

The overall maturity level for FCA’s data protection and privacy program is **Defined**. Williams Adley determined FCA’s data protection and privacy program is not effective based on the metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit.

The data protection and privacy program includes the following attributes:

- A comprehensive plan and framework that includes developing additional supporting policies and procedures and addresses OMB A-130 and A-108,
- A breach response plan that includes policies and procedures for data breach reporting, assessment, notification of affected parties due to a data breach, and identifies data breach response team members and incident management team members,
- Annual information security and privacy awareness training to employees and contractors that provides examples of PII and sensitive information and guidance for protecting sensitive information,
- Encryption of laptops, and
- Restriction of writing to unauthorized devices.

**Condition:** FCA has not developed a process for maintaining and tracking a personally identifiable information (PII) inventory. Additionally, FCA has not:

- Defined its policies and procedures related to data exfiltration or enhanced network defenses,
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

**Cause:** Although FCA’s formal Data Protection and Privacy program was started in FY 2019, privacy control implementation is a lengthy process that is taking them over a year to implement.

**Criteria:**

- NIST SP 800-53, REV 4:
  - [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]

\(^{11}\) Personally, Identifiable Information (PII)
Effect:

In FY 2020, FCA made progress in addressing previously identified data protection and privacy deficiencies. For example, FCA developed and formalized policies and procedures for the data protection domain.

During the FY 2018 FISMA evaluation, FCA OIG made several recommendations to improve FCA’s data protection and privacy program. Therefore, Williams Adley did not make additional recommendations in this area. The following recommendations remain open in FY 2020:
FCA needs to develop and communicate policies and procedures that identifies the inventory of PII, and other sensitive data collected, used, and maintained that needs increased protection.

FCA needs to formalize policies and procedures for:
- Encryption of data at rest,
- Encryption of data in transit,
- Limitation of transfer to removable media, and
- Sanitization of digital media prior to disposal or reuse.

FCA needs to develop policies and procedures related to preventing data exfiltration.

Security Training
People are often the weakest link in security. Security training helps to ensure that personnel at all levels understand their information security responsibilities to properly use and protect the information and the resources entrusted to them. Therefore, a well-defined security training process must include continual training of the workforce on organizational security policy and role-based security responsibilities to increase its rate of success in protecting information.

Williams Adley determined FCA’s security training program is not effective based on the metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit. The overall maturity level for FCA’s security training program is **Consistently implemented**.

The security training program includes the following attributes:
- Annual IT security awareness training that contained content relative to the Agency,
- Specialized annual IT security awareness training for IT specialists, including individuals with significant security responsibilities,
- IT security training materials for new employee and contractor orientation,
- Tracking the status of IT security awareness training to ensure all information system users completed the training,
- Obtaining feedback on annual IT security awareness training and documenting frequently asked questions to further inform users, and
- Measuring the effectiveness of its IT security awareness training program through phishing exercises.

**Condition:**

**Cause:**

**Criteria:**
- NIST SP 800-181, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 requires the following:

- Effect:
  - Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Security Training domain:

  **Recommendation 5:** Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology (OIT):

  **OIT Response:** FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation and will:

  **Williams Adley Response:** The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.
**Detect**

The Detect function of the Cybersecurity Framework enables timely discovery of an information security event. The Detect function comprises one domain—Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM)—which seeks to provide visibility into IT assets, awareness of threats and vulnerabilities, and visibility into the effectiveness of deployed security controls.

Williams Adley evaluated the domain, Detect, using the guidance provided by DHS. Based on DHS's scoring methodology, FCA met the criteria for Level 4, **Managed and Measurable**.

**Information Security Continuous Monitoring**

ISCM enables an entity to maintain ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions. Without a fully implemented ISCM program, FCA may be unable to detect attempts to damage its systems, resulting in unauthorized access, data loss, operational failure, or unauthorized data modification. FCA would also be unable to develop the key security metrics needed to measure and monitor the effectiveness of its current information security posture.

Williams Adley determined FCA’s ISCM program is effective based on the ISCM management metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit. The overall maturity level for FCA’s information security continuous monitoring program is **Managed and Measurable**.

FCA’s ISCM program includes the following attributes:

- An ISCM Strategy that provides visibility into IT assets,
- An awareness of vulnerabilities and threats,
- Security alerts,
- Weekly security briefings that include a discussion of the top risks, vulnerabilities, and significant items observed during monitoring,
- Annual penetration tests,
- Security control assessments performed by independent contractors, and
- A process for tracking weaknesses identified during audits, inspections, penetration tests, and security control assessments.

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12 NIST SP 800-137, ISCM for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, September 2011.

13 Security posture includes the design and implementation of security plans and the approach the entity takes to information security. It comprises technical and non-technical policies, procedures, and controls to protect the entity from internal and external threats.
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Portions of this report have been redacted to protect information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security.
Effect:

Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Information Security Continuous Monitoring domain:

**Recommendation 6:** Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology (OIT) implement the following controls:

**OIT Response:** FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation and will take corrective action. OIT's estimated completion date for these actions is [date].

**Williams Adley Response:** The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.

**Respond**

The Respond function, which consists of incident response, supports the ability to act in response to a detected cybersecurity incident and to limit the incident's impact.

The information security function area for Respond includes the Incident Response domain. Williams Adley evaluated the domain using the guidance provided by DHS. Based on DHS's scoring methodology, FCA met the criteria for Level 3, **Consistently Implemented.**

**Incident Response**

NIST SP 800-61, Revision 2 states, “Incident response is the process of detecting and analyzing incidents and limiting the incident’s effect.” Major phases in the incident response process include preparation; detection and analysis; containment, eradication, and recovery; and post-incident activity.

The overall maturity level for FCA’s incident response program is **Consistently Implemented.** Williams Adley determined FCA’s incident response program is not effective based on the metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit.

The incident response program includes the following attributes:

- A 24-hour Helpline available to employees needing incident assistance,
- A requirement that Agency staff immediately report to the Helpline any IT equipment or sensitive information that is suspected to be missing, lost, or stolen or suspected security incidents,
- A threat alert log for tracking potential incidents,
• Collaboration and reporting of security incidents to DHS,
• Notifications of security incidents to the OIG, and
• A variety of tools used for incident detection, analysis, and prioritization.

Condition:
•

Cause:

Criteria:
• NIST SP 800-53, REV 4:
Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Incident Response domain:

**Recommendation 7:** William Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology

**OIT Response:** FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation. OIT's estimated completion date for the following actions is

**Williams Adley Response:** The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.
Recover
The Recover function seeks to reduce the negative impact of an information security event through the timely recovery of normal operations via contingency planning.

The information security function area for Recover includes the Contingency Planning domain. Williams Adley evaluated the domain using the guidance provided by DHS. Based on DHS’s scoring methodology, FCA met the criteria for Level 1, Ad-Hoc, which is defined as not effective.

Contingency Planning
According to NIST SP 800-34 Revision 1, “Contingency planning refers to interim measures to recover information system services after a disruption. Interim measures may include relocation of information systems and operations to an alternate site, recovery of information system functions using alternate equipment, or performance of information system functions using manual methods.”

Williams Adley determined FCA’s contingency planning program is not effective based on the metrics developed by DHS and related testing performed during this audit. The overall maturity level for FCA’s contingency program is Ad-Hoc.

FCA’s contingency planning program includes the following attributes:
- A Continuity of Operations Program that provides a strategy to ensure continuity of essential Agency functions during emergency conditions,
- A Disaster Recovery Plan that provides guidance on the process needed to immediately respond to disasters or major incidents impacting the Agency’s IT services,
- Identification of mission essential functions, and
- An alternate recovery site to facilitate continuity of mission essential functions.

Condition:  

Cause:  

Criteria:
- NIST SP 800-34, REV 1,  
- NIST SP 800-53, REV 4,
Based on the audit procedures performed during FY 2020, Williams Adley identified the following recommendation for the Contingency Planning domain:

**Recommendation 8:** Williams Adley recommends that the Office of Information Technology

**OIT Response:** FCA OIT Management agrees with the recommendation. OIT’s estimated completion date for the following actions is

- [redacted]
- [redacted]

**Williams Adley Response:** The corrective actions will be evaluated during the OIG recommendation closeout process.
**OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY**

**Objective**
The objective was to perform an independent audit of the FCA’s implementation of FISMA\(^{14}\) for FY 2020. In support of this objective, Williams Adley conducted the audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). In reporting the Cyberscope report we relied on OMB 20-04, *FY 2019 - 2020 Guidance on Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Requirements*, reporting guidelines.

**Scope**
The audit focused on reviewing the FCA’s implementation of FISMA for FY 2020. The audit included an assessment of the effectiveness of the FCA’s enterprise-wide information security policies, procedures, and practices, and a review of information security policies, procedures, and practices of a representative subset of the FCA’s information systems, including contractor systems and systems provided by other federal agencies. Based on a risk-based methodology, Williams Adley identified three inhouse maintained systems. Those three (3) major FCA information systems were selected for the audit:

-  
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**Methodology**
Williams Adley performed qualitative analyses to assess the effectiveness of the FCA’s efforts to secure its information systems. The audit included an assessment of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Function Levels, as specified in the FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics:

- Identify (Risk Management)
- Protect (Configuration Management)
- Protect (Identity and Access Management)
- Protect (Date Protection and Privacy)
- Protect (Security Training)
- Detect (Information Security Continuous Monitoring)
- Respond (Incident Response)
- Recover (Contingency Planning)

FISMA requires each federal agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide information security for the information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or source. To ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of these controls, FISMA requires an independent

\(^{14}\) Public Law. No. 113-283, FISMA, December 18, 2014.
annual review of the information security program and the head of the agency to report those results to OMB. The FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics developed by the OMB, DHS, and CIGIE is intended to provide guidance on the OIG’s annual evaluations, as required by the FISMA, 44 U.S. Code, section 3555(j).

Williams Adley performed this audit from May through September 2020 and conducted this audit in accordance with GAGAS. GAGAS requires that Williams Adley obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for its findings and conclusions based on the auditor’s evaluation objectives.

To perform this audit, Williams Adley interviewed FCA senior management and employees to evaluate managerial effectiveness and operational controls in accordance with NIST and OMB guidance. Williams Adley remotely observed FCA’s operations, obtained evidence to support Williams Adley’s conclusions and recommendations, tested the effectiveness of established or defined controls, conducted sampling where applicable, and collected written documents to supplement observations and interviews. Williams Adley provided a draft report to FCA management on October 27, 2020. An exit conference was offered to the FCA OIT Management, and it was determined that it was not necessary after a lengthy vetting meeting held on October 22, 2020.

Use of Computer Processed Data
During the audit, Williams Adley used computer-processed data to obtain samples and information regarding the existence of information security controls. For example, Williams Adley obtained system-generated reports of the information system inventory from FCA personnel. These reports were used to support the audit procedures in the risk management IG FISMA metric domain. Williams Adley assessed the reliability of the computer-generated data primarily by comparing selected data with source documentation, data from prior years, inquiring with FCA personnel, and observing the selected data being generated. Where applicable, Williams Adley determined that the information was sufficiently reliable for assessing the adequacy of related information security controls.

Sampling Methodology
For all samples selected during the audit, Williams Adley used non-statistical sampling techniques where applicable and appropriate. As guidance, Williams Adley used the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Audit Guide Audit Sampling. This guidance assists in applying sampling in accordance with auditing standards.

With respect to the sampling methodology employed, standards indicate that either a statistical or judgmental sample can yield sufficient and appropriate evidence. Based on professional judgement, Williams Adley did not use statistical sampling during this audit. Williams Adley employed another type of sample permitted by standards—namely, a non-statistical sample

known as a judgmental sample. A judgmental sample is a sample selected by using discretionary criteria rather than criteria based on the laws of probability. In this audit, Williams Adley has taken great care in determining the criteria to use for sampling based on its judgement of risk. Moreover, Williams Adley used, whenever practicable, random numbers to preclude the introduction of any bias in sample selection although a non-statistical technique was used. Williams Adley acknowledges that it is possible that the information security deficiencies identified in this report may not be as prevalent or may not exist in other information systems that were not tested. However, a prudent person without any basis in fact would not automatically assume that these deficiencies are non-existent within other systems. Such a supposition would be especially ill-advised for an issue as important as information security.

Evaluation, testing, and analysis were performed in accordance with guidance from the following:

- Chief Financial Officers Council, Enterprise Risk Management Playbook
- Chief Information Officer Council/Chief Acquisition Officer Council, Cloud Computing Contract Best Practices
- GAGAS
- Cybersecurity Sprint
- Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan
- Department of Homeland Security Cyber Incident Reporting Unified Message
- E-Government Act of 2002
- Federal Acquisition Regulation sections 39.101, 105, 52.224-1, 52.224-2, and 52.239-1
- Federal Continuity Directive 1
- Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015
- Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework
- Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Roadmap and Implementation Guidance
- Federal Information Processing Standards 199
- Federal Information Processing Standards 201-2
- Government Accountability Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
- National Archives and Records Administration, Guidance on Information Systems Security Records
- National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework
- National Insider Threat Policy
- National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-30
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-34
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-37, Revision (Rev) 2

Portions of this report have been redacted to protect information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect information security.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-39
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-40, Rev 3
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-44
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-50
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53, Rev 4
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-60
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-61, Rev 2
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-63
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-83
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-84
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-86
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-122
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-128
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-137
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-161
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-181
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-184
- Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11
- Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123
- Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130, Appendix I
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 04-25
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 08-05
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 14-03
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 14-04
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 16-03
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 16-04
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 16-17
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 17-09
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 17-12
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 17-25
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 18-02
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 19-02
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 19-17
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum 20-04
- Presidential Policy Directive - 41
- Privacy Act of 1974, as amended
- SANS Institute, Critical Security Controls
- Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
- Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure
- US-Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Incident Notification Guidelines
- US-Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Incident Response Guidelines